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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 78

Accident time: 12:05

Accident Date: 06/08/1997

Where it occurred: Gulany Haji Farag,
Derbandikhan District

Country: Iraq

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: SB/AS

Date of main report: 25/08/1997
Name of source: MAG

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate training (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
The demining group was operating a three-man team with a two-man drill at the time of the
accident. One man used the detector, marked any readings, and another man came forward
to excavate the reading, feel for tripwires and cut any undergrowth. A third man at any one
time was resting.
A "Senior Mines Specialist" for the demining group carried out an investigation and the report
was made available. There was considerable doubt about the reliability of the statements
taken during an original investigation so further interviews were conducted and the report
prepared (not dated but sometime after 24th August) from which the following is taken. There
were two separate accidents occurring five minutes apart at the same site. This was the
second of these accidents.
The victim began clearance and located a series of PMNs (six in all). He marked each mine
with a wooden picket. As he worked, he marked his lane by taking markers from the right
side of the lane and placing them on the left.
The Team leader was preparing to destroy the discovered mines when he was injured in the
first mine accident on the site that day [See accident No.227]. After the Supervisor had dealt
with that accident he went looking for the deminer who had found the mines, intending to
appoint him as the acting Team Leader.
The deminer later said that he was returning to the lane to collect his equipment, but the
investigator decided that he was trying to conceal his incorrect marking of the lane. The
investigator thought it likely that he was using a spike to knock in the marking stakes when he
slipped and detonated a mine, possibly with the spike.
The victim was given first aid and taken to the Emergency hospital in Sulymania. He was not
given an IV infusion.
[The protective equipment worn by the victim was not recorded.]

Recommendations
The investigator recommended that all staff should be briefed on the need to adhere to SOPs,
that staff should be told that if they saw unsafe practices they could refuse to work, that an
addition to SOPs should be written to cover PMN minefields and that medics must be told
"again" to administer an IV cannula to all mine casualties.

Victim Report
Victim number: 108

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 33

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 30 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: not recorded

Helmet
Short visor
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Hearing
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minor Legs
minor Neck
severe Hand
COMMENT: See medical report.

Medical report
A medical report from the “Emergency hospital” stated:
Admitted 06/08/97 following a mine injury.

Discharged 18/08/97

Diagnosis:
Crushed injury left hand (compound fracture 3rd metacarpal with loss of articular
surface.
Superficial injury to Left arm, neck, Right thigh and Left leg.
Deaf – pain in both ears following explosion.
Debridement of all wounds in OT.
10/08/97 DBR left arm and delayed primary suture Left leg in OT.
13/08/97 Seen by ENT surgeon
Bilateral perforation of both tympanic membranes.
Suffering from tinnitus.
Treat with antihistemine, Stemetil, Amoxicillin, protect from water completely.
See again after 1 month.
16/08/97 DPC Left arm and Left thigh in OT.
18/08/97 Discharged – to attend OPD for dressings every third day.
02/09/97 Wounds clean. To attend hospital for dressings for approximately 2-3 weeks.
Hearing improved. To attend ENT clinic on 14/09/97.

Analysis
The accident is classed as a “missed mine” accident because the Victim was apparently
placing marking pegs to delineate the cleared area (which he had neglected to do properly as
he worked) when he detonated a mine. He clearly believed he had cleared the area where he
was hammering in markers, so he had “missed” the mine.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was working in breach of SOPs and his errors were not corrected. That he had been selected
for a temporary position of authority prior to the accident raises questions about the selection
method and the lack of appropriate training. Other mines had been missed in the area, which
reinforces the view that field control was inadequate and that training was suspect. The
secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems likely that Victim had been
influenced (excited) by the accident and was rushing to correct an error without thinking
properly about where to position the sticks.
The victim may not have been wearing his helmet and visor, or may have had his visor raised.
However, the short visor (attached to a helmet) issued by this demining group may have
allowed the victim to sustain throat injuries while wearing his equipment correctly. The gap
between a collar and the visor can be wide, especially when the helmet is tipped back on the
head and the visor standing well away from the face.
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